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Abstract 
In this paper, first, we utilize the Lowner-John ellipsoid of a convex set to hide the lattice data information. 
We also describe the algorithm of information recovery in polynomial time by employing the Todd-
Khachyian algorithm. The importance of lattice data is generally due to their applications in the 
homomorphic encryption schemes. For this reason we also outline the general scheme of a homomorphic 
encryption provided by Gentry. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The classical model for invisible communication 
was firstly presented by Simmons [8]. Alice and 
Elena are imprisoned. They want to make an 
escape plan. Turnkey fully supervises them, and 
any suspicious message would corrupt their 
relationship. Suspicious statements include 
statements code, which might be inaudible. So they 
ought to situate their important information inside a 
normal text patterns to not arouse suspicion. This is 
called steganography [1,7,8]. For example, Elena 
can send Alice a post-modern painting, data cover 
space, and the turnkey cannot understand whether 
the painter follows any special purpose through the 
geometrical forms.  
The first applicable version of the Fully 
Homomorphic Encryption was introduced by 
Gentry in his PhD thesis and then improved by 
Smart, Vercauteren, Gentry and Halevi in 
[3,4,5,13]. The public key of these schemes 
corresponds to a basis (skewed basis) for a lattice, 
while the private key corresponds to another more 
orthogonal basis (good basis) of the same lattice. 
A public-key steganography allows two people, 
who have never exchanged a secret, to send hidden 
messages over a public channel so that an 
adversary cannot even detect that these hidden 
messages are being sent [12]. 
Our goal in this paper is to introduce a simple way 
to send secret information, such as the vectors of a 
lattice vector, using a new steganography method. 
This method is applicable for binary data, media as 
well as vectors.  
For this purpose, John’s uniqueness Ellipsoid 
theorem and Edges Based data Embedding 
steganography method are exploited.  We hide the 
vectors information via the maximal length vector 
of the ellipsoid associated to a convex polytope. 
We also describe the algorithm of information 
recovery in polynomial time with the help of the 
Todd-Khachyian algorithm. 
This method of steganography is important to 
improve the security of the encryptions based on 
the lattices like the Gentry’s fully homomorphic 
encryption. For the sake of completeness and 
educational purposes we provide a description of a 
toy model for the fully homomorphic cryptography 
scheme, based on notes from the Gentry and Halevi 
speeches and papers [3,4,5,6,10] 
2. Description of the Gentry’s scheme for fully 
homomorphic encryption. 
The basic of fully homomorphic encryption is 
somewhat homomorphic encryption. Somewhat 
homomorphic encryption is a type of encryption 
which is homomorphic for a special class of 
functions. This type of encryption is suitable for 
computing the problems presented by polynomials 
of small degree.  
The first semantic secure fully homomorphic 
encryption was presented by Craig Gentry [3,4]. 
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He extend the domain of a somewhat 
homomorphic encryption which was introduced by 
Cracker to a broader domain using the method of 
bootstrapping. We provide a description of the 
Cracker’s method here. Cracker applied a set of 
polynomials : nq qf Z Z  which are zero at the 
point  1, ,
n
n qs s Z   as an encryption of the 
element 0 nqZ . This set is denoted by  0Z . In 
fact he used the set  0Z  as the public key of his 
encryption. The special key is the point
 1, ,
n
n qs s Z  . To encrypt an element 𝑚 one 
chooses a random element  0g Z , the 
ciphertext is    1 1, , , ,n nc x x m g x x     to 
decrypt the ciphertext it is enough to use the 
special key  1, , ns s  and compute the evaluation 
of  1, , nc x x  at this point.  
(1)  
  
    
1
1 1
, ,
, , , , ,
sk n
n n
Dec c x x
Eval sk c x x c s s
 
  
 
It is easy to see that the Cracker’s encryption is a 
fully homomorphic encryption. But unfortunately it 
is not semantically secure. The problem of   
semantic security of Cracker’s encryption is 
equivalent to the problem of Ideal’s membership. 
So, it is easy to brick the Cracker’s encryption. 
Gentry added some noises to the Cracker’s 
encryption to overcome this problem. Note that we 
can use binary numeral system, therefore it is 
enough to find a fully homomorphic encryption of 
0 and 1. 
Let us represent pZ  with the set
 0,1, , 1p   . Gentry used the set of all 
polynomials    
    10 : , , 2  . . i n i iSE f f s s e s t e p      
as the new public Key. These polynomials are 
nominated as Small and even polynomials or 
smeven. For encryption one must choose a random 
element  0g SE . The ciphertext associated to 
 0,1m  is the polynomial    
(2)      1 1, , , ,n nc x x m g x x     
For decryption it is enough to evaluate 
 1, , nc x x  at the secret key  1, , ns s  and 
then compute it in mod 2.  1, , nc s s  is called 
the noise of the ciphertext.  
Now we overcame the security problem of the 
Cracker’s encryption. But, still there is a problem. 
The noise 2 ie  grows under summations and 
multiplications. After some multiplication and 
summation it is possible that 
 1 2 1 22k km m m e e e      be a 
multiple of p  where 1 2 km m m   is an odd 
number. So, we have an error in our computation.  
So the algorithm is true only for special polynomial 
of small degree. In fact we have a somewhat 
homomorphic encryption. 
 
3. Somewhat homomorphic encryption using 
polynomials of degree 1. 
In this section we apply the Cracker’s algorithm for 
polynomials of degree 1. This helps us to have a 
less sophisticated but secure codes which are 
suitable for bootstrapping techniques. Let q  be a 
natural number such that  gcd ,2 1q  . We use an 
arbitrary element  1, , ns s  of  
n
qZ  as the special 
key (uniform distribution). Let, 
(3)           1 1, , , ,n nc x x m g x x     
 
    (4)  
be a set of functions of degree 1 such that  
(5)     1, , 2    i n i if s s e e q  . 
Let 0 1 1 n ng a a x a x    be an arbitrary 
element of  1 0S . As in the Cracker’s algorithm 
case let the ciphertext associated with m  be the 
polynomial    c x m g x  . The semantic 
security is a result of the Hash Lemma. Summation 
over polynomials 
   1 1 1 2 2 2 ,c m g x c m g x     preserves the 
degree. But multiplication of polynomials
   1 1 1 2 2 2 ,c m g x c m g x     leads to a 
polynomial of degree 2.   
(6)     
 
1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2
1 2
, 0
.
n
i j i j
i j
c c m m m g m g g g
c c x x

   
 
 
where 0 1x  . 
Note that the cloud servers are able to handle huge 
data. But, decryption of data’s has its own limits. 
Growing of the degrees under the multiplication is 
a big problem. Now we present a solution for this 
problem.  
1 2.c c  is a polynomial of degree 2. We use a re-
encryption of 1 2.c c  via another secret key in such a 
way that the noise part of multiplication looks like 
a linear function. First using reparametrizations 
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ij i jS s s  and ij i jX x x of secret key and 
variables we achieve a degree one polynomial of 
 2O n  variables. 
(7)   
     1 2
i j ij ij ij
ij ij
C X c x c x
c c X C X

  
. 
Now we show that there is a way to transform a 
long linear ciphertext  C X  with N n  variables 
to a shorter one. We ask the cloud server to send us 
the function    i j ijijd x c c h x  where 
  ijh x  are linear functions of n  variables which 
are added to the public Key.  ijh x  is chosen in 
such a way that ( )ij ijh t S , for a second secret 
Key  1, , nt t   . The answer of the cloud server 
is now a linear function of n  variables (instead of 
a linear function of  2O n  variables). So, we must 
evaluate a linear function of n  variables to decrypt 
the multiplication 1 2c c . This is a toy model of the 
bootstrapping method.  
There is only a small problem. Let us have a glance 
at the next formula  
(8)  
    
   
 
.
.
ij ij ij
ij
ij ij
ij
d t C S smeven
C S C smeven
 
 


. 
 
It is possible that .
j iji ij
C smeven  is not a 
smeven. Gentry applied the method of bit 
decomposition for  C X  to replace ijC  with 'ijC  
such that   
(9)  
    
  
 
2
. 2
  '.
ij ij
ij
modp mod
ij ij
ij
C S C smeven modp mod
C S C smeven

 


 
and  '.ijij ijC smeven  be an smeven. So, using 
this action (which is called the  ,SwitchKey s t  
action) we can control the increasing of noises. 
And therefore we have an effective fully 
homomorphic encryption. In a similar way 
phenomenon like before leads to a lattice based 
fully homomorphic encryption. Now we describe 
an LPR encryption. An LPR encryption consists of 
a parameter q , a ring
 
1
q
n
Z y
R
y


, a secret 
key s R , and a set of functions
     0 { | 2 , }i i i iL f x f s e e q  . For 
encryption of an element 
 2
1n
Z y
m
y


 we 
add an arbitrary element  0g L  to m . A 
phenomenon like before leads to a lattice based 
fully homomorphic encryption.   
4. Lattice data steganography 
The proposed method of data steganography is 
based on Edges Based data Embedding (EBE) 
method. In order to hide an ordered set of vectors 
1, ,
n
nv v R   we utilize distinct vector 
steganography  , nii v R . Now we provide some 
definitions in functional analysis which are used in 
this section.  
Definition 4-1: A subset of a vector space is 
convex when 
(10)     , 1   0 1  x y V tx t y V t       . 
Definition 4-2: In a metric space, a set is compact 
provided that any Cauchy sequence of this set owns 
a convergent subsequence [9]. 
Definition 4-3: Suppose that 
nK R  is an n-
dimensional compact convex set. Among all 
ellipsoids enclosing
nK R , there is a unique 
ellipsoid of minimal volume which is called the 
John-Lowner ellipsoid of the convex set [2]. 
We aim to hide the important vectors of the lattice 
in a convex set. To this end, we set these vectors as 
the principal vectors of the John-Lowner ellipsoid 
of the convex object.  
Definition 4-4: An embedding process is a 
function defined as  :    E C M C  , where, C is 
a set of covers and M is a set of utilized texts. The 
recovery function D,  :    D C M , recovers 
original text from the cover space. In this case both 
transmitter and receiver must have access to the 
embedding and recovery functions. When
  ,D E c m m , then  , , ,C M D E  is called a 
pure steganography system. 
In order to create our steganography scheme we act 
as follows. Let CM  be the set of all compact and 
convex subsets in
nR , and C be the set of all 
ellipsoids included in
nR . Considering the fact that 
any ellipsoid is its own John’s ellipsoid, all 
ellipsoids can be conceived as the John’s ellipsoid 
of some compact convex sets. The set of compact 
convex spaces, whose John’s ellipsoid is E, is 
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presented by EC . In order to accomplish 
steganography of an ordered set of vectors
2
1, ,
n
sv v R
  , we use distinct steganography of 
vectors  , , ni ii j v R , where, ij  indicates the 
coordinates system part in which the vector iv  is 
located. To perform steganography, firstly, we hide 
a vector in the ellipsoid E and then, we hide this 
ellipsoid by selecting one member of EC . 
Theorem 4-5: For any vector there exists a set of 
ellipsoids centered at origin where the vector 𝑣and 
its reflection v  are the only vectors with the 
longest distance from the origin.  
Proof: The set of n -dimensional ellipsoids is 
invariant under the action of orthogonal group
( 1)SO n  . There is a matrix A  in ( 1)SO n 
which sends a given vector w of length || ||v  to the 
vector v . Also, ( )A w v   . Now, using a matrix 
( 1)B SO n   which sends  || ||,0, ,0v   to v  
on the ellipsoid
2 2 2
1 ( 1)(|| || ) ( ) 1i iv x x   , 
where
1
|| ||v
  . The appropriate ellipsoid is 
prepared.                                                        
The set of ellipsoids centered at origin is 
denoted by B and the ellipsoids centered at origin 
for which the only maximum length vectors are 
,v v  is denoted by vB . To distinguish the 
selection of ,x x  we use the integer 
 21,2, ,2nij    which illustrates the direction 
of vector.  Now, we suppose that the members of 
vector space V are the text elements which must be 
hidden, i.e. M V . Moreover assume that the 
covering set is the set of subsets of CM , i.e. 
 CC P M . For the function :f V B , which 
acts as the element v  in vB , and the function
: Cg B M , which plays the role of ellipsoid E  
in the set EC , we define the following 
steganography embedding function: 
(11)     
     
  
: ,C C
L
P M V P M A T
T
gof A
s
 
 
  
 
. 
Where 𝑠 is selected so that  gof A  is greater than 
all ellipsoids. By defining the function e  as a 
function which sends the compact convex set T  to 
the largest ellipsoid included inT , we have the 
following theorem: 
Theorem 4-6:   , , ,CL e P M V  is a pure 
steganography system. 
Proof: By the axiom of choice and the theorem 4-5 
there is a 1-1 map from V  to ( )cP M . Therefore,
( ) ( ( ))ccard V card P M . Also, looking at the 
unique vector of maximal norm in an element of 
( )cP M  we have   ,D E c m m . As a result,  
  , , ,CL e P M V  is a pure steganography system. 
 
Note that in order to provide a space to present 
effective algorithms; we may replace the 
steganography set constructed by all convex spaces 
with the set generated by convex polyhedrons. In 
fact, any convex polyhedron can be expressed by 
finite set of numbers. Using these numbers, the 
polyhedron can be constructed. Also note that 
instead of using the convex set Y  it is possible to 
utilize the set whose convex hull isY . 
5. Extraction Algorithm  
In this section we provide an approximate 
extraction algorithm for over steganography plan, 
when the steganography set is a set of convex 
polyhedrons. This extraction algorithm is based on 
the Khachiyan-Todd ellipsoid finding algorithm 
[11]. 
Let A  denotes both 1{ ,..., }mA a a and the matrix 
constructed by them. The first part of the algorithm 
provides a subset 0X A which has better 
behavior to find the Lowner-John ellipsoid. 
 
1,..., } ex
s
sLet A A be the set of all conv
polygon in the steganography plan
A={
 
1:for h s  
hA A  
1
0
0
{ ,..., }
2 , . . Re
{0}, , 0.
\ ,
m n
n
A a a
if n m n then X A v turn
X k
while do
loop


 
  
  

1,..., 0 0
1,..., 0 0
1;
arg max ( ) { }
arg max ( ) { }
{ , }
k n
k T i
i m
k T i
i m
k k pick an arbitrary direction b in
the orthogonal complement of
b a X X a
b a X X a
span a a
endloop


 



 


  
  
  
 
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0 0
0
0
0
0 1
0
 1/ | |,
, 0
0, 1, (( ) ,1) , 1,..., .
{ : ( ) 1}
,
m
i
i
i
i i T T
n T
Let p be such that p X for
a X p otherwise
k d n q a i m
y y p y
while does not satisfies the approximate
optimaly conditions do
loop



 
 
    
   

1
1
1
arg max {( ) ( ) : 1,..., },
( ) ( ) ;
arg max {( ) ( ) : 1,..., , 0},
i T k i
j jT k
i T k i k
i
j q p q i m
q p q
j q p q i m p
  






  
 
   
1( ) ( ) ;
( / ) 1, ( / ) 1
{ , }
jj T k
k
q p q
d d

   
  
 

   
 
 
    

 if then  
1
;
( 1)
(1 ) , 1;
k
jk k
k k
d
n
p p e k k



  






    
 
else { , }
( 1) 1
k
j
k k
j
pd
n p







 

 
1 (1 ) , 1;
jk k
k kp p e k k 
       
1 (1 ) , 1;
jk k
k kp p e k k
else
       
 
{ , }
( 1) 1
k
j
k k
j
pd
n p







 

 
 
1 (1 ) , 1;
jk k
k kp p e k k 
       
1
1
;
( 1)
(1 ) , 1;
{ , }
( 1) 1
(1 1
 
) , ;
k
jk k
k k
k
j
k k
j
jk k
k k
d
n
p p e k k
else
pd
n p
p p e k k



 



 













    
 

 
    
1{ : ( ) 1}
{ : 0}}.
,
n T k
k
i k
k i
k k
and if
y y p y
X a A p
endloop
Output X


   
    
( ,:)
1
kC h
h h
end
output C

 
 
 
The limit of the sets  kX  is 0X  and the limit of the 
ellipsoids k  is the wanted Lowner-John ellipsoid. 
The matrix C provides the information of the john 
ellipsoids.   
Since 1log  kvol  is equal to half of
1logdet Λ kp  ,  
the value of k  obtained with the help of the 
expression  
 
  1arg max (log det 1 β Λ ).
0,1
jk
k p e 
  

Note 1:  According to the Khachiyan-Todd  
method up to a solution of a quadratic equation,  
the complexity of the extraction algorithm is 
4 log )( )(( / )n nO kmn n for a (1 ) -
approximation of the ellipsoid finding problem, 
where k   is the number of polytopes which are 
used in the steganography plan and
2(1 ) (1 )
n
    . In fact, the first part of the given 
algorithm provides (1 ) -approximate quadratic 
form for a given convex set. Todd-Yildrim-
Khachian says that the complexity of computation 
of each action of this approximation is
( log( ) / )O n n n  . Also each action takes 
( )O mn  operations where  mn  is the size of the 
matrix constructed by m  vectors in 
n
. Also we 
must apply the algorithm for all k  polytopes of the 
steganography plan. According to Lagrange 
 6 
 
multiplier method, finding the diameter of the 
ellipsoid provided by this algorithm is the same as 
finding the solution of a quadratic equation and a 
set of n linear equations. By Gauss elimination 
algorithm the complexity of finding solutions for n  
linear equation is
3( )O n . As a result, up to solving 
a quadratic equation the complexity of the given 
algorithm is
4 log )( )(( / )n nO kmn n .  
Note 2: There are many other spatial 
steganography methods such as spread spectrum 
steganography, LSB steganography, pixel value 
differencing steganography, code based 
steganography, mapping based steganography and 
palette based steganography; see [14, 15, 17, 18]. 
We compare our result with two of these methods, 
i.e. spread spectrum steganography and LSB 
steganography. Spread spectrum spectography 
considers the problem of blind extracting data 
embedded over a wide band in a domain of a 
digital medium. One of the most popular 
algorithms of this kind is M-IGLS. When the 
complexity of each iteration of this algorithm is 
3 2 2(2 2 (3 ) )O K LMK K L M L K    , where 
L is the host image parameter and K  and M  
respectively denote the number of distinct message 
and length of each message [15]. To compare, we 
set K m  and M n . So in our notation the 
complexity of each iteration is 
3 2 2(2 2 (3 ) )O m Lnm m L n L m    . 
This is a polynomial of degree 3 in m and degree 1 
in n. So the complexity of our algorithm is higher 
than the complexity of this algorithm where the 
length of the hidden data is large and therefore our 
method is more secure than this algorithm for such 
a data. On the other hand this algorithm has better 
security where the number of hidden data is large. 
Now, we compare our method with the LSB 
method.  
LSB method, the Least Significant Bit technique, is 
the simplest and most popular method of image 
steganography. In many cases the key-recovery 
complexity of LSB method is asymptotically a 
linear function [16]. As a result, the security of our 
method is very high, however finding the keys are 
very hard even for friends. In fact, our method is 
totally different from the previous methods of 
steganography and it is natural to use this kind of 
steganography for a few numbers of massages of 
large length like the special keys of a fully 
homomorphic encryption or credit cards accounts.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we applied Lowner-John’s ellipsoid to 
determine a steganography method to hide the 
messages containing the vectors of the lattices 
which is important to improve the security of the 
encryptions based on the lattices. Also we provide 
a review of the Gentry’s idea for a fully 
homomorphic encryption. As future work we 
intend to develop algorithms to find the Lowner-
John’s ellipsoid for “special” convex sets which 
may result in implementation of the proposed 
method. 
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